Wildcard TLS Certificates for Envoy Gateway on Management Clusters
| Created | State | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-01-30 | approved | Use wildcard TLS certificates on management clusters with Envoy Gateway to eliminate per-service domain configuration in gateway-api-config. |
Problem Statement
Currently, TLS certificates for services exposed through Envoy Gateway on management clusters are managed by the gateway-api-config app using a single Certificate resource with multiple Subject Alternative Names (SANs). Each time a new application requires a domain, it must be explicitly added to this list.
This approach creates friction:
- Manual configuration updates: Every new service requiring a domain triggers a change in
gateway-api-config. - Developer experience mismatch: Teams familiar with Ingress expect domain configuration to be handled at the HTTPRoute level. The current requirement to update a central certificate configuration is unexpected and causes confusion.
Proposal
Use a wildcard TLS certificate (*.baseDomain) per management cluster to cover all services, eliminating the need for per-service domain configuration.
Key Changes
- Certificate configuration: Replace the multi-SAN certificate with a single wildcard certificate (
*.baseDomain) ingateway-api-config. - ACME challenge method: Switch to DNS-01 challenge validation, which is required for wildcard certificates. Some clusters may need to migrate from HTTP-01 to DNS-01.
What This Enables
- Teams can define HTTPRoutes for any subdomain under
*.baseDomainwithout requiring certificate configuration changes. - The developer experience aligns with expectations from Ingress-based workflows.
- Reduced operational overhead for certificate management.
Scope and Limitations
- Services within
*.baseDomain: Automatically covered by the wildcard certificate. - Services outside
*.baseDomain: Custom domains or the barebaseDomainitself will still require explicit certificate configuration, as they do today. - Domain discovery: Remains at the Gateway level. This is an Gateway API architectural constraint, not something changed by this proposal.
Alternatives Considered
1. Keep the Multi-SAN Approach (Status Quo)
Continue using a single certificate with explicit SANs for each service domain.
Pros:
- No migration effort required.
- Explicit list of domains provides visibility.
Cons:
- Requires configuration updates for every new service.
- Creates confusion for teams expecting HTTPRoute-level domain handling.
- Operational overhead scales with number of services.
2. Per-Service Certificates
Issue individual certificates for each service using cert-manager’s Gateway API integration.
Pros:
- Fine-grained certificate management.
- Certificate compromise affects only one service.
Cons:
- Does not solve the core problem: Domain discovery happens at the Gateway level in Gateway API, not at the HTTPRoute level. This means
gateway-api-configwould still require updates for each new service domain. - Increased certificate management complexity.
Implementation
Prerequisites
- DNS-01 challenge support must be available for the cluster’s DNS provider.
- cert-manager must be configured with appropriate DNS provider credentials.
Changes Required
- gateway-api-config: Update the Certificate resource to request
*.baseDomaininstead of listing individual SANs. - cert-manager configuration: Ensure DNS-01 solver is configured for the relevant DNS provider (e.g., Route53, CloudDNS, Azure DNS).
- Cluster migration: For clusters currently using HTTP-01 challenges, migrate to DNS-01.
Rollout
- Deploy to a test management cluster first.
- Verify certificate issuance and renewal with DNS-01.
- Gradually roll out to other management clusters.
Security Considerations
- Blast radius: A compromised wildcard certificate private key affects all services under
*.baseDomain. - Private key protection: The certificate private key is stored as a Kubernetes Secret. Access should be restricted via RBAC.
- Certificate renewal: cert-manager handles automatic renewal. DNS-01 challenges do not require ingress exposure, which can be a security advantage over HTTP-01.